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ragmatics in the history
f linguistic thought
Andreas H. Jucker
Introduction
yr'lgll.W'L' is still a relatively young branch of linguistics. It was only in the
1970s that more and more linguists started to devote their attention
this field. The International Pragmatics Association (IPrA) was founded in
Its early conferences took place in Viareggio (198S), Antwerp (1987).
BalrCeloTIla (1990), and Kobe, Japan (1993). The international Journal of Prag-
started publication in 1977, and the journal Pragmatics in 1991 (Mey
720). The Journal of Pragmatics started with about 400 pages per year
the seventies and has steadily increased its volume to over 2,500 pages
per year by 2009. This increase is mirrored in similar increases in the vol-
ume oftextbooks, monographs, collected volumes, more specialized j onrnals
(Pragmatics & Cognition 1993, Historical Pragmatics 2000, Intercultural Pragmatics
2004, International Review of Pragmatics 2009, Pragmatics and Society 2010), and
in particular in the publication of handbooks in pragmatics (Mey 1998b;
Verschueren et al. 2003; Horn and Ward 2004; Mey 2009a; Cummings 2010;
and Bublitz et al. 2010-). Pragmatics is no longer just a small subfield of
linguistics but one of the dominant areas, indeed it may be argued to have
become a discipline in its own right. It has developed "from a humble beginM
ning at the remote outposts of philosophy and linguistic semantics ... into
a vast realm where often conflicting theories and practices reign" (Mey
2009a: vi).
Given such a large and diverse field of study, it might reasonably be ques-
tioned whether it is at all possible to write a coherent history for this field.
In 1996, Biletzki still maintained that this was not possible. Pragmatics -
according to him - did not have a history.
Its maturity is attested to by both the number of practitioners in the field,
and the variety of directions in which its branches grow out to various
My thanks for very useful comments on a draft version of this contribution go to Wolfram Bublitz, Daniela landert, Irma
Taavitsainen and the editors of this handbook. The usual disclaimers apply.
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disciplines. Yet sitting on any of the branches of this pra ..::
. . . .. gmatlCtt
be. theY,PhIIosophIcal, hngmstlC, psychological- One wonders iftl1~.
mlghtn .t tO~Pl: ove~' for l~ck of roots. For pragmatics seems to h~0'·
formal, mstltutlOnahzed hlStory. (Biletzki 1996: 455)
In the meantime, several (partial) histories of pragmatics hav
. e appear
most notably Nerhch and Clarke (1996) and Nerlich (2009, 2010).
T~o lssue~ are at stake. First, where does the history begin and JB[
penod does It cover? Does it focus exclusively on the roots of tl, d" -..
. . . e lSClpr
before It constituted Itself as a recognized field ofstudy? Or does it alsacd
the development of the discipline over the forty or so years Ofl'tS .
. . eXlstenc
The Introd~ctlOn ofthe tern1 "pragmatics" is generally attributed to ChaI'1
Sanders Pelfce (1839-1914) and to Charles Morris (1901-1979), but the fig
only c0n.stltuted Itsel.f as such in the 1970s. And second, the historiari
pragmatIcs m~st dec~de on the delimitation of the field of pragmatics,1:
order to locate ItS vanous roots at a time when the field had not co t'
. ns Itlltltself(see e.g. Biletzki 1996: 457-9).
I s.hall take a broad view on both these issues by including not onlyp
matlCs avant la lettre but also a brief and necessarily selective accoun.t
the development of the discipline itself and by adopting a broad, basic~ll
Con~Inental European view of pragmatics (see below). First, I shall briefl
o~thne some of the roots of pragmatics in the academic traditionsorth
mneteenth and early twentieth century, at a time when the term "pra . ··:t:····•.
'''d . gl1l~ICS ha not been Introduced and when it was not linguists but scholarsi
other fields who were interested in studying the use oflanguage. In a secOfl
step I shall briefly refer to the work by philosophers such as Peirce, Mortis
and Carnap, who in the first half of the twentieth century first introdu~~d
and used the term "pragmatics". This leads on to the work by the ordina
language philosophers Austin and Searle, and also to Grice, who in the 19s:6~
~nd 1960s :0 a large extent set the agenda for the more widespread woI'
m pragmatIcs in the 1970s and 1980s, when the field of pragmatics reall
took offand was taken over by linguists. The second part ofthis contributi6rt
is then devoted to the further development of pragmatics in the context'()f
linguistic thought in general and against the background ofsome impOrtafl
paradigm shifts that have radically transformed the landscape oflinguistl2
over the last four or five decades.
24.2 Pragmatics avant la lettre
In a ~ider sense the roots of pragmatics can be located in all those philo-
soplucal traditions that rejected the "descriptive fallacy" (Anstin 1962: 3),
i.e. the idea that language represents states of affairs that are either true
or false. Language is more than just a representation ofthollghts, it is use4
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speakers to cOlllmunicate with each other, to in~uence hearers in cer~
11 ways, and, indeed, to change the world (see Nerhch 2010: 193). Such a
oflanguage has its roots in antiquity. It was part of the rhetoric in the
beral arts" or "trivium" of rhetoric, grammar, and logic. From its earliest
innings rhetoric has been concerned with the art of persuasion, with the~erent methods by which speakers can influence their audience. In his
etoric Aristotle distinguished three ways of persuading others: logos, the
ppeal to their reason; pathos, t~e appeal to their em.otions; and ethos, tl:e
peal to the speaker's personal1ty or character (see Corbett 1990: 37). Ans-
Ptle thus focuses on the effect that language has on the audience and how
ese effects can be achieved (see Dascal and Gross 1999; Tindale 2010)1
In the nineteenth century language studies were almost exclusively
cused on historical~comparative linguistics, the regularities of sound
'hange, and the reconstruction of earlier languages. Linguists were inter~
sted in individual languages and the relationships between them. They
hrnpared different languages in order to establish common ancestor lan~
ages and in order to reconstruct older languages. Such a perspective did
ot leave much room for studying language in use, language in its social
nd communicative context, and the effects of language on the audience.
owever, there were several neighboring disciplines such as philosophy,
psychology, sociology, and semiotics, in which language was seen from an
interactive and communicative perspective. What these disciplines had in
common was that they saw language not just as an organism growing in
1.110re or less predictable ways and not as a system that only serves to rep~
resent true or false states of affairs, but as a means to communicate with
others, as a nleans of influencing others in specific ways, and as a means of
doing things (see Nerlich 2009: 329; Nerlich and Clarke 1996).
Early uses of the term "pragmatics"
It is the American mathematician and philosopher Charles S. Peirce (1839-
1914) who is generally credited with the coining ofthe term "pragmatism."
Parmentier (1997: 3), however, points outthatitwas thepsychologistWilliam
(1842-1910) who introduced it as the "principle ofPeirce" into philo-
sophical discourse. But Peirce is the father of pragmatism, a theory of mean-
ing that is based on a theory of signs and the effects which they have on
our conduct (see Nbth 1990: 41). The theory also focuses on th~ connection
between thought and action. Later, Peirce changed the term "pragmatism"
to "pragmaticism" in order to differentiate it from janles's use of the term,
taking "pragmaticism" to be a term "so ugly that ... no one would dare steal
it" (Parmentier 1997: 5).
The American philosopher Charles Morris (1901-1979) integrated ideas
from Peirce's pragmatism or pragmaticism into his own theory of signs,
which he called "semiotic," using a term coined by John Locke (1632-1704).
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Today the field is commonly known as "semiotics." The IUGst famous as~
of this theory for linguists and pragmaticists is the semiotic triangle MB
. art
distinguished three branches of semiotics: syntactics, semantics, and"p'r
matks, which are devoted to the syntactical, semantical, and pragma{
aspects of signs. Syntactics deals with signs and their relationships towaf
each other. Semantics deals with the signs and their meanings. And pr
matks deals with the signs in relation to their users. In fact, every si
must always include all three dimensions of semiosis. It is only fori~
lytical purposes that the relation between different signs, the meaningq
signs, and the relation of signs to their users can be distinguish€'d(s~,
Petrilli 2000: 6 for details). Morris's conceptualization of pragmaticsw:d
very broad. "It is a sufficiently accurate characterization of pragmatits,{
say that it deals with the biotic aspects of semiosis, that is, with anti{
psychological, biological, and sociological phenomena which OCCUr init
functioning of signs" (Morris 1938: 108; quoted by Levinson 1983: 2). Such.
definition is much broader than the Anglo-American approach to pragITl
ics and is much closer to the Continental European approach (see beld
section 24.5).
The German-born and V.S.-naturalized philosopher RudolfCarnap (189~
1970), on the other hand, was influential in narrowing down the scope,(')
pragmatics. He conceptualized Morris's semiotic triangle in the followi#g
way.
Ifin an investigation explicit reference is made to the speaker, or to put·
in more general tenus, to the user of the language, then we assign it:[tii
investigation] to the field of pragmatics ... Ifwe abstract from the userb
the language and analyze only the expressions and their designata, weal'
in the field ofsemantics. And, finally, ifwe abstract from the designata alsO.
and analyze only the relations between the expressions, we are in (logical
syntax. (Carnap 1938; quoted by Levinson 1983: 2-3)
This definition ofpragmatics focuses on the user ofthe language. It doesIlQ
invoke the effects on the audience or the larger social and cultural conte*
in which language is used.
Levinson (1983: 3) points out that Carnap's definition of pragmatics le
some scholars to adopt a very restricted scope of pragmatics, which \Va
basically reduced to considerations of deictic elelnents. Elements, such as I;
you, this, here, and so on, require for their interpretation reference to the tise:t
of these expressions and, therefore, fall squarely under Carnap's definition;
for whom the domain of semantics is a proper part of that of pragmaticsiJ
opposite to current contextualism.
But at the same time philosophers like Austin, Searle, and Grice had already
started to analyze ordinary language. They came to be known as "ordinary
language philosophers," had a massive influence on the early development
of pragmatics - and they continue to be influential up to the present day.
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...--------=---
Philosophers of language
Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) in his
garIy writings (often called the Early Wittgenstein) advocated a form of ana-
)rtical philosophy that relied on an ideal language and on symbolic logic or
;lquasi-mathematical notation for the analysIs of phIlosophIcal problems.
e ordinary-language philosophers, on the other hand, focused their atten-
tion on an analysis of ordinary rather than ideal languages. It was, in fact
udwig Wittgenstein in his later writings (known as the Later Wittgenstein),
ho was one of the earliest proponents of ordinary-language philosophy. It
is still a nlatter of controversy how exactly the Later Wittgenstein differs
om the Early Wittgensteil1, but it is the Later Wittgenstein's views on the
meaning of words that are particularly important for the development of
pragmatics. He refutes the position that words in a language name objects
~nd that sentences are combinations of such names. Instead, Wittgenstein
proposes that 'the meaning ofa word in a large class ofcases is "its use in the
language" (Wittgenstein 1953: 18).
The Oxford philosopher J. L. Austin (1911-1960) is best known for his
posthumously published book How to Do Things With Words (1962). The book
was based on the lecture notes of the William James Lectures he delivered
at Harvard University in 1955. The book starts with the contrast between
performative utterances, i.e. utterances that perform an action, and asser-
tions or constatives that describe a state of affairs and have specific truth
conditions. Performatives do not have truth conditions; instead they have
felicity conditions, that is to say conditions which must be satisfied in order
for the speech act to successfully perform the intended action. In the later
part of the book, the theory is extended into a more conlprehensive account
in which constatives, too, are seen as actions. By using them, speakers per-
form the action of stating and thus these acts are also subject to felicity
conditions (Austin 1962: 136). In his discussion of speech acts, Austin distin-
guishes three main aspects that pertain to eveIY speech act. The first aspect,
the so-called locutionary act, consists in the act of uttering speech sounds,
the basic act of talking itself. The second aspect, the illocutionary act of an
utterance, describes the conventional nature ofan act, such as stating, order-
ing, asking, promising. warning, or thanking. The third aspect, finally. the
perlocutionary act, describes the effect that is achieved by performing the
act, for instance in the form of persuading or convincing the ~ddressee or
getting him or her to do something (see Sbisa 2006, 2010: also Kissine. this
volume).
Austin's theory of speech acts is often conflated with that of John Searle
(b.1932). who has been described as "one ofthe most influential contributors
to speech act theory and pragmatics in the last forty years" (Kirk 2010: 416).
Searle studied at Oxford with Peter Strawson, Peter Geach. and J. L. Austin.
After his studies he took up a position at the University of California at
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Berkeley. On the basis of Austin's pioneering framework Searle devel()
a more thorough and more detailed theory- for the analysis of speech
In his consider~tion of illocutionary acts, to pick out a central asp
e
et6f:
theory, he explIcates a set of conditions that must obtain for the success
performa~ce.ofparticular illocutionary- acts, and on that basis he spe1I1ti
the con.stItutlve rules for that particular speech act. He demonstratesth:
steps wIth the example of promising (Searle 1969: 57-64). The Propositid
content rule specifies that the proposition ofa promise must concern a fut
act A of the speaker S. The preparatory- rule specifies that a promise carrti
be successfully uttered if S has good reasons to believe that H would
S' d". pre
s OIng A to his or her not dOIng A, and only if it is not obvious to b()
Sand H that S will do A anyway. The sincerity rule states that a proll1!
can only be felicitously uttered if S intends to do A. And the essentialrtil
finally, requires that the utterance in question counts as an undertakin
an obligation to do A. g
The third philosopher oflanguage who had a major and lasting influehd
on pragmatics was H. Paul Grice (1913-1988). In pragmatics he is best
for his theory- of cooperation and conversational implicatures,
basically an account of how a hearer can work out aspects otmeaJoirlg
a speaker intended without explicitly expressing them.2 He starts by
that conversations are - generally speaking - cooperative enterprises,
he formulated in his "Cooperative Principle": "Make your conve",atioJlal CO'Il-
tribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accelJtect
purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged"
1975: 45). At a more detailed level and echoing !Cant, Grice distinguishes
four categories ofQuantity, Quality, Relation, and Manner, and within
categories a number of more detailed maxims. The category-
to do with the quantity of information provided and its two maxims
that speakers should make their contributions as informative as is re<Juired,
and they should not make theln more infonnative than is required.
category of Quality has one supermaxim that stipulates that speakers
make their contribution one that is true, with the more specific maxims
to say what they believe to be false and not to say that for which they
adequate evidence. The category of Relation contains a single maxim
relevant." The category- of Manner, finally, relates not to what is said but
how it is said. The supermaxim requires the speaker to be perspicuous,
the specific maxinls spell this out by requiring the speaker to avoid uc»cun.ly
of expression and ambiguity, and to be brief and orderly.
Interlocutors generally assume each other to be cooperative, but sp,ea1<:ers
may fail to observe one of the maxims. In some cases the requirements
two maxims clash, as for instance, when a speaker cannot give as
information as is required without violating the maxim of tnlthl1um,ess,
The assumption that speakers are generally cooperative even ifon oo:asiorls
they fail to observe all of the maxims provides a systematic account
hearers can read between the lines of what the speaker says, that is to
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they can work out the implicit meaning or - in Grice's words - the
VIversational implicatures" (Grice 1975: 49). Such implicatures may result
n h" dhen the maxims are observed. "When a speaker asserts t at most stu ents~"", e handed in their assignments," he or she implicates that some did not
hav 'ji't "lltdt"e otlleI'W"ise it would have been more In ormatlve 0 say a s u en s.becaus ... . .
plicatures also derive ifmaxllns are flouted, l.e.lftheu requlfe~entsare
fulfilled in order to achieve a particular effect. In the case of Irony, for~ '"
ce the maxim of truthfulness IS flouted In order to commUnIcate aIlstan ,
lated proposition. If a speaker says "X is a fine friend," to use Grice's (1975:
53) example, in a situation in which it is clear to the speal~erand the hearer
that the speaker does not believe this, an implicature derIves that states by
nd large the opposite ofwhat the proposition expresses.
Grice's work, like that ofAustin and Searle, has had a lasting influence on
development of pragmatics. It is the work of these three philosophers
has most regularly been referred to in all the textbooks on pragmatics,
the very early ones, e.g. Leech (1983) and Levinson (1983), to the more
e.g. Cummings (2005), Huang (2007), and Bublitz (2009).
Anglo-American and Continental
European pragmatics
Quite early in the histOly of pragmatics two different ways of doing prag-
matics, or schools of thought as Huang (2007: 4-5; 2010: 341) calls them,
established themselves. One of these ways can conveniently be described as
the Anglo-American tradition of pragmatics, the other as the Continental
European tradition. Levinson (1983: 2, 5-6) had already pointed out the dis-
tinction between these two traditions, and it is noteworthy that thirty years
later the two traditions can still be clearly delimited in the various textbooks
and handbooks. Cruse's (2000: 16) definition of pragmatics is typical for the
Anglo-American school of thought:
[P]ragmatics can be taken to be concerned with aspects ofinfonnation (in
the widest sense) conveyed through language which (a) are not encoded by
generally accepted convention in the linguistic forms used, but which (b)
none the less arise naturally out of and depend on the meanings conven-
tionally encoded in the linguistic forms used, taken in conjunction with
the context in which the forms are used.
Thus, within this school of thought, pragmatics is concerned 'With the study
of meaning that arises through the use of language. This is also called the
component view of pragnlatics. Pragmatics is seen as one of the core com-
ponents within linguistics responsible for a clearly delimited set of tasks
and clearly distinct from other core components, such as semantics, syn-
tax, morphology, or phonology. On this view, anthropological linguistics,
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applied linguistics, and psycholinguistics are considered to be more
eral components oflinguistics (Huang 2007: 4). The setoftasks
~ co~ponent is responsible includes the study of presuppositions,
lrnphcatures, and speech acts.
The Continental European school of thought, on the other hand,
pragmatICS to have a fiuch wider range of tasks. In fact, it is not
particular component oflingllistics on a par with other component
- s,
a speCIfic perspective for studying language in general. Verschueren
1) provides a typical definition:
[PJragmatics can be defined as the study of language use, or, to enlpl,o,
somewhat more complicated phrasing, the study
the point ofview of their usage properties and processes. [Sic.]
He adds explicitly that "pragmatics does not constitute an additional COmll'"
nent ofa theory oflanguage. but it offers a different perspective" (V,'r":hltet"l"l
1999: 2. italics original). This school of thought, therefore, is also
perspective view. Mey (2001: 6) proposes an equally wide view
Communication in society happens chiefly by means of language.
ever, the users of language, as social beings, conlmunicate and use
guage on society's premises; society controls their access to linguistic
communicative means. Pragmatics, as the study of the way humans
their language in communication, bases itselfon a study ofthose prerr,i,,'S
and determines how they affect, and effectualize, human language
Hence: Pragmatics studies the use of language in human communication as
mined by the conditions ofsociety. [Sic.]
Mey's textbook is split into two parts, entitled "micropraglnatics"
"macropragmatics." Micropragnlatics deals with context, ilnplicature,
ence, pragmatic principles, speech acts, and conversation analysis and
coincides more or less with the research interests of Anglo-American
matics, while the part entitled Inacropragmaties adds a range of topies
are only part of Continental European but not Anglo-Alnerican pragm"ti,:s,
such as literary pragmatics, intercultural pragnlatics, and the social
of pragmatics.
The difference between these two schools of thought is clearly reflected
the relevant textbooks and handbooks ofpragmatics. Horn and Ward
for instance, explicitly exclude the broader, sociologically based Eur01>ea.n
view of pragmatics from their Handbook ofPragmatics and focus on the
narrowly circumscribed, mainly Anglo-American conception of llTLgullSlK
and philosophical pragmatics and its applications" (Horn and Ward
xi). Huang (2007: 5), who also adopts an Anglo-American approach in his
:extbook .on pragmatics, argues that the Continental European tradition
IS too all-mclusive and therefore lacks a clear delimitation and defies
attempt to establish a coherent research agenda.
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textbooks by Verschueren (1999) and Mey (2001) mentioned above
early adopt the wider Continental European approach and also include
uestions about the social and cultural contexts in which language is used.
e Handbook ofPragmatics edited by Verschueren et a!. (2003) and the series
fhandbooks edited by Bublitz et a!. (2010-) also include many topics that
onsider the use oflanguage from a cultural and social perspective.
Paradigm shifts and diversification of pragmatics
The beginning of pragnlatics as an independent sUbdiscipline within lin-
uistics constituted a major paradigm shift in linguistics. To repeat, it took
glace in the 1970s and 1980s and radically changed the landscape oflinguis-
'cs. "What was marginal in the 1970s has come to be of central interest,
above all pragmatics" (Traugott 2008b: 207). It was accompanied and fol-
lowed by several smaller paradigm shifts. Together they brought with them
an unprecedented strengthening and broadening of the field of pragmatics,
but they also led to a significant diversification ofpragmatics and a split into
Ulany subdisciplines of pragmatics. Particularly important in this respect
are the following paradigm shifts (based in part on a much longer list in
Traugott 2008b: 208-9).
1) From competence to the use oflanguage. Speakers do not just rely on one
homogeneous systenl of language use. They adopt their use of language
to the changing situations in which they find themselves in the course
of their daily lives.
2) From introspective data to empirical investigations of contextualized
data ofvery different kinds. Such data includes both spoken and written
instantiations of language ranging from formal to informal, from polite
to hostile and aggressive, from casual to academic, and so on.
3) From homogeneity to heterogeneity. Language is no longer seen as a
homogeneous but as a dynamic system subject to spatial, social, and
diachronic variation.
4) From synchrony to diachrony. Language change is seen as an important
factor in the description of language and of languages.
These paradigm shifts individually and in combination affected the develop-
ment not only oflinguistics but also ofpragmatics. In the following sections,
I shall briefly sketch their significance for the current state of research in
pragmatics.
24.6.1 From competence to the use of language
The paradigm shift from an analysis of native speaker competence to the
study of the use oflanguage affected linguistics as a whole. It is often called
"the pragmatic turn" and as such is the foundation stone of pragmatics in
general. Before this shift, there were only few linguists who were interested
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in t~e use oflanguage. But the shift brought a sea change. Pragmatics beb
maInstream.
The Chomskyan school of linguistics, which dominated the discipJi
the
d
l960
d
s and 1970s saw a theory ofsyntax as the main theoreticalframew
an tne to mtegrate the other levels oflinguistic descriptions - phcmoib
morphology, and semantics - into this fralnework. Linguistic theory,a~t
ing to Chomsky (1965: 9), was concerned with "the knowledge ofthe lan
by a speaker-hearer," i.e. the language competence of the speaker an~
hearer. He explicitly excluded the study of how language was used in a~
situations, i.e. the study of performance.
John Robert Ross and George Lakoffwere the first linguists who tried to
themselves from the domination of syntax. Lakoff proposed an alterri~ti
framework called "generative semantics", in which semantics rathertli
syntax was the driving force. But later Ross and Lakoff started to work:
what came to be known as pragmatic territory.
The American structuralists had treated language with a scientificH
borrowed from the natural sciences. Meaning had not played a signifia
role in such an endeavor. Chomsky allowed such semantic notions a.s:~~
onymy and ambiguity into his theory and thus "opened a door for semanti~,~
(Leech 1983: 2). Ross and Lakoff opened the door even further. Generativ
semantics, however, which in spite of its name was stilllnainly a syntac
theory rather than a senlantic one, was short-lived. It turned out that so@
of the problems, such as presuppositions and illocutionary force, couldrl6
really be handled in such a framework.
Forty years ago in a paper aptly entitled "Out of the pragmatic waste1J~
ket", the Israeli linguist Yehoshua Bar-Hille! (1915-1975) complained aboll
scholars who ignored the pragmatic nature of certain linguistic probleII'l
and tried to force them into syntactic or semantic theories. "Be more care
with forcing bits and pieces you find in the pragmatic wastebasket into
favorite syntactico-semantic theory" (Bar-Hillel 1971: 405). His image
"pragmatic wastebasket" has often been quoted to refer to problems
resisted a satisfactory analysis at the level of syntax or semantics.
In the end, the wastebasket started to overflow and many linguists
to turn their interests to the contents of the wastebasket itself.
When linguistic pioneers such as Ross and Lakoff staked a claim in
matics in the late 1960s, they encountered there an indigenous
philosophers of language who had been quietly cultivating the territ()ry
for some time. In fact, the more lasting influences on modern pT<lgrnatics
have been those of philosophers; notably, in recent years, Austin
Searle (1969), and Grice (1975). (Leech 1983: 2)
As a result, the early work by linguists who turned their attention
the "performance" of language, i.e. the use of language in context,
fall back on the work by these language philosophers. As pointed out
the opening paragraph of this paper, pragmatics constituted itself as
significant subfield of linguistics in the late 1970s and early 1980s
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own journal (Journal of Pragmatics) that started publication in 1977, with
. s of international conferences in the 1980s and with several relevant
sene
J(tbooks (Levinson 1983: Leech 1983: and Green, G. M. 1989: but see also
~veryinfluentialmonograph by Gazdar 1979). The language problems that
:reviously had been assigned. to the wastebasket had become respectable and
portant objects of research. The focus was no longer on the ~om~etence
£the native speaker-hearer but on the performance in actual sltuatlOns. In
y's (2009a: 796) words,
[t]he waste basket has served its function - I am not saying it is quite e~pty
t but we have managed to upgrade the basket to a more promInent~, .
position, and accorded it descriptive and explanatory status as a recognIzed
field oflanguage studies.
24.6,2 From introspective data to empirical investigations
The language philosophers Austin, Searle, and Grice had all worked with
introspective data. Their reflections on language were based on their intu-
ition and their competence as native speakers of English. In linguistics, dom-
inated by Chomskyan linguistics, too, introspection was the only - and the
only acceptable - method of research. The object of study was the internal-
ized language (i-language for short) of the native speaker, Le. the system of
knowledge that underlies the native speaker's ability to use and understand
language, rather than the externalized language (or e-language), which man-
ifests itselfin observable reality (see Chomsky 1986: 19-24). The only access to
i-language was through the native speaker's intuition. Intuition was deemed
to be superior to corpus data because corpus data, even if extremely large,
may fail to contain a particular construction that any native speaker imme-
diately recognizes as grammatical.
One major branch of linguistics that broke away from this tradition was
sociolinguistics, which turned to rigorously empirical methods in order to
investigate how actual language use (forms ofe-language in Chomsky's terms)
correlates with the social class of its speakers (see, for instance, Labov 1972).
Many pragmaticists, too, soon started to employ empirical methods of
language investigation. In 1974 a paper appeared in Language, which had
a lasting influence on pragmatics. In it, Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson,
three sociologists and ethnomethodologists, used detailed transcriptions
of naturally occurring conversations in order to analyze t~e minutiae of
the turn-taking system. In the 1980s, conversation analysis and discourse
analysis became important branches within linguistics. Not all of them
took their analytical methods from Sacks et al. (1974), but they all relied
on faithfully transcribed data from more or less naturally occurring con-
versations and on detailed analyses of the regularities in this type of data.
Landmark publications were, for instance, Schiffrin's (1987) seminal ana-
lysis of discourse markers or the textbooks by G. Brown and Yule (1983) or
Stubbs (1983).
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In the 19805 pragmaticists also began to experiment more systematic~
with elicitation techniques. Blum-Kulka et a1. (1989), for instance, usedd
course completion tasks in order to investigate differences in the way~'<
which different cultures issue requests or apologies. Requests and apologl
are two speech acts that are particularly interesting for such an investi
tion since requests threaten the addressee's negative face and apologiesth
speaker's own positive face in the sense ofP. Brown and Levinson (1987).1
such tasks, an utterance by an interlocutor would be given. This canb~
university lecturer, for instance, who reminds the student respondent of'
book that should have been returned by today. The respondent's answef;
left open for the participant to fill in. A second utterance by the lectllt
then indicates that the apology has been accepted. Discourse completiti
tasks, in spite of the criticism that they have subsequently received, at~'a
useful means for gathering large amounts ofdata that is comparable acro
different groups of speakers, and it is a method that is still regularly usedB
some pragmaticists.
Trosborg (1995) also investigated requests and apologies, to which sIJ.
added complaints as speech acts that threaten the addressee's positivefac~;
She used role plays and role enactlllents as a method to elicit these speeCh
acts from Danish learners of English and from native speakers of Englisll
In a role play, the participants impersonate a personality that differs fro
their own experience, while in a role enactment they perform a role thati
part of their normal life or personality. The participants would be asked,fo
instance, to perform the role ofa student who complains to a fellow student:,
living in a flat upstairs about the noise that is preventing him or her from
preparing a talk for the next day.
In the 1990s the computer became more and more important as a researc4
tool in linguistics in general. By that time, corpus linguistics had alread
established itself as a respectable field oflinguistic enquiry, but the nineti
with the more widespread availability ofcomputers and personal compute
in particular, led to an explosion of computer corpora and of corpus-base
work in linguistics. It took somewhat longer for this trend to reach pragmat
ics. A pioneering example is the work by Aijmer, who used the London-LuI1~
Corpus ofSpoken English to describe conversational routines, such as tharil<i
ing, apologizing, and making requests (Aijmer 1996), and discourse particle~C,
such as now, oh, ah, just, and sort of (Aijmer 2002). Deutschmann (2003) use<i
corpus-linguistic methods to investigate apologies in the British Nation~li.
Corpus. He argued that apologies in British English are routinized to sucli<i
degree that searches for elements such as sorry, excuse, or pardon retrieve most
ofthe apologies in the corpus. Stenstrom et al. (2002) and G. Andersen (2001)
provide a detailed pragmatic analysis on the basis of the Corpus of Londo~'
Teenage Language (COLT).
Corpus pragmatics faces some difficult methodological challenges. Whil
surface forms, such as particular discourse markers or routinized phrase
can relatively easily be retrieved, it is very difficult to retrieve underlyi~
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peech functions such as specific speech-act values or expressions of polite-
eSS. For some more recent work see, for instance, Adolphs (2008), who inves-
;h~·ates a range ofutterance functions in large corpora ofspoken English, and
he papers in the collections ofRomero-Trillo (2008), and ofJuckereta1. (2009).
It has to be stressed that this brief sketch of a development of different
eS ofdata in pragmatic research should not be seen as reflecting a linear
development leading from one type of research to the next. What happened
as rather that new types ofdata and new research methods became available
nd added to the research methods that were already there and thus led
to an increasing diversification of pragmatics. In fact, there is no research
method and no particular type of data that is constitutive of pragmatics
in general. Even the introspective methods that stood at the beginning of
the development of pragmatics have not disappeared. In certain branches,
such as cognitive pragmatics and in particular Relevance theory (Sperber
nd Wilson 1986; Blakemore 1992; Carston 2002), introspective data is still
the chosen method. While lllany researchers argue for the superiority of
a particular method of investigation, others advocate a more eclectic view
that appreciates the relative strengths and weaknesses of research methods
in relation to the specific analytical task to be undertaken. See for instance
Jucker (2009), who discusses a broad range of research methods that have
been applied in the research of speech acts and in particular in the research
of compliments and compliment responses.
24.6,3 From homogeneity to heterogeneity
A further paradigm shift that had major consequences for the landscape
oflinguistics was the shift from homogeneity to heterogeneity. Chomskyan
linguistics tried to describe a homogeneous system of native speaker com-
petence. Such fields as sociolinguistics and text linguistics that started in
the 1970s focused on the variability oflanguage and its heterogeneity. The
paradigm shift can also be discerned in the monumental descriptive gram-
mars of the English langnage. Quirk et al.'s Grammar of Contemporary English
(1972) and their Comprehensive Grammar ofthe English Language (1985) aclmowl-
edge some dialectal and stylistic variation in English but in general they
describe the English language as a more or less homogeneous entity. Biber
et a1. (1999), on the other hand, in their Longman Grammar ofSpoken and Written
English focus centrally on the differences between spoken and written English
and between different genres ofwritten English, such as news l.anguage, aca-
demic discourse, and the language of fiction. English is no longer seen as a
homogeneous entity. The heterogeneity is foregrounded and taken seriously.
The early work in pragmatics also depended to a large degree on the
(implicit) assumption of a language as a more or less homogeneous entity.
Pragmaticists were perhaps not particularly quick to pick up the trend set
by sociolinguists to focus on variability and heterogeneity in language. TIle
reason for this 111ay be the fact that sociolinguists largely concentrated on
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phon~logical variation, variation that was taken to imply no difference in
meamng of what was said, Le. on different ways of saying the same thi
Pragmaticists, on the other hand, were explicitly interested in the
ings ~fwhat.was said, i.e. in elements that were more difficult to con1:I'~~:
And III fact, It was in contrastive pragmatics that pragmatic units werefi
compared in different varieties, or rather - at least initially - in differentl~'
guages. Contrastive pragmatics grew out of a very active research traditi6
of contrastive linguistics. An early volume was Oleksy (1989), which c()
bined articles that discuss the possibility of contrasting pragnlatic entiti
e.g. speech acts, across different languages and different cultures. Sever~
papers deal with compliments and investigate the realization of this parti2
ular speech act in different cultures. Krzeszowski (1989), one of the papersi
that volume, discusses the problem ofcontrastive studies from a more the
retical angle, viz. the choice and the status ofa specific tertium comparationisd
the notion of equivalence "since only equivalent elements across langua.g¥
are at all comparable" (Krzeszowski 1989: 59). Some aspect of the constn.tC'
tion under investigation has to stay constant across the different contextsih
which it is to be compared. Several of the other papers in the same voll1ni~
focus on praising, con1plimenting, and responses to compliments and co
pare these speech acts across different cultures and languages, e.g. Polis
and English.
A distinction must be made between contrastive and intercultural pr~~.
matks. Contrastive pragmatics sets out to compare interactive patterrisirt
different cultures, while intercultural praglnatics focuses on the inter~2..
tions between members of different cultures. In both cases culture is ofteh
understood in a very wide sense and can refer to linguistic differences
between groups of people, to generational differences, to social differences,
or to gender differences. Generalizations across such groups are difficlllt
and tend to lead to stereotyping, but statelnents about differences betwee
the groups or about interactional problems that occur in conversatiOIls
between members of different groups depend on generalizations for enti&
groups.
In fact, earlier work in intercultural pragmatics often set out to identitY
problem areas in the interaction between members of different cultureS
and how these could lead to misunderstandings (see, for instance, Scol1()I1
and Scollon 2001). In recent years, however, the field has moved on to 100IC
"beyond n1isunderstandings," to use the formulation of the title of avoi~
ume edited by Biihrig and Ten Thije (2006). The focus has moved away
from merely looking at the factors that prevent understanding to a close
analysis of the processes that lead to mutual understanding. Moreover,
recent work in intercultural pragmatics no longer accepts the essentialisf
assumptions that speakers belong to or have a particular culture and as such
are at the mercy of the peculiarities of this culture. Cultural assumptiorls
are constructions that are jointly created and re-created by large groups of
people.
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These groups are too large to be "real" groups (Le. no group n1ember
will ever know all the other group members). Therefore, they are best
considered as discursive constructions. That means that we do not have
culture but that we construct culture discursively. (piller 2007: 211)
ere is also a noticeable body of work on pragmatic differences between
ifferent groups ofspeakers ofthe same language, most notably on the differ-
~nces between the genders. The papers in a volume edited by Tannell (1993a),
for instance, focus on gender-related patterns in conversational interaction.
Holmes (1995) and Mills (2003) investigate the differences in politeness behav-
ior between men and women.3 Holmes uses data collected in New Zealand
~nd focuses on the ways in which men and women use hedges and boosters,
and how they pay compliments or apologize, while Mills develops a model of
the complex relation between gender and politeness in order to challenge the
stereotype that women are more polite than men. Beeching (2002) focuses on
the same stereotype but she uses French data, and she uses four pragmatic
particles, c'est-er-dire (que), enfin, hein, and quoi for her argumentation.
Recently, there has been a growing interest in some ofthe other dimensions
of language-internal variation of pragmatic entities. Schneider and Barron
(2008a) have given this field ofinvestigation its own name, "variational prag-
matics," which they see as a field at the intersection ofpragmatics and dialec-
tology. Schneider and Barron (2008b), in the introduction to their volume,
develop a framework for variational pragmatics in which they envisage five
types oflanguage variation as possible dimensions ofinvestigation: regional,
sodo-economic, ethnic, gender, and age variation. The articles in their vol-
provide case studies of regional variation and contrast the realization
in corner-shop transactions in Ecuadorian Andean Spanish and
Coastal Spanish (Placencia 2008), for instance, or the realizational patterns
of small talk in England, Ireland, and the USA (Schneider 2008).
24,6.4 From synchrony to diachrony
last paradigm shift to be briefly outlined is the shift from a strictly syn-
chronic analysis of language to a dynamic and diachronic analysis. In fact,
de Saussure's clear-cut distinction between synchronic and diachronic lin-
guistics has given way to an understanding oflanguage as a dynamic system
in which older and newer forms co-exist and any description of language
has to take its history seriously. As a result historical linguistics has grown
in importance, and at the same time it has extended its interests from the
confines ofthe core areas oflinguistic investigation, such as phonology, mor-
phology, syntax, and semantics, to wider investigations of the history of the
Use of language.
The growing interest in language history coincided with the growing inter-
est in the compilation ofcomputerized corpora. This combination led to the
Helsinki Corpus, which combines a large selection of historical English texts
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covering the period from about 750 to 1700 and a broad range of differ
text genres (see for instance the papers in Rissanen, Kyt6 and Palander~C6I
199~). ~is g:neral-purpose diachronic corpus was soon followed by-lil'-";
speCialIzed dIachronic corpora, for instance the Corpus of EaTly Englislid
respondence (1403-1800) or the Corpus of Early English Medical Writ
(1375-1800). The availability of such corpora, at least for the Englis1tTa
guage, was the basis for an unprecedented proliferation ofwork in histoHd
linguistics. Much ofthe work was sociolinguistically inspired, e.g. Nevalairi~
:~~ ~:~'::~~~:;~~:::;r~~~~~~ ~;~~~;ainen and Pahta (2004), Neva!a (2oq~i
At the same time some pragmaticists started to turn their attentibnt
a larger range of empirical data. They insisted no longer on the llatiW
s~eaker intuitions of language philosophers or on the faithful transcI'i~
tlO~S of aurally reco~ded conversational data. Instead they started to accep:
varIOUS forms of wntten language as legitimate and useful data for iI1v~k
tigation. Thus, the formation of historical pragmatics as a new branchd
pragmatics in the 1990s can be seen as the direct result both ofthe paradi
shifts in linguistics in general and the shifts within pragmatics. Jucker
was an early volume that gave the new field a focus. Since then histc,ri,a)
pragmatics has established itself with its own journal (Journal of Hi,;tar,cI11
Pragmatics), a large range of monographs, collected volumes, and re,:en,tly
substantial handbook Uucker and Taavitsainen 2010).
In the meantilne, historical pragmatics has established itself as a
OilS and lively branch of praglnatic research, which sees itself as a
of enquiry that investigates patterns of language use in earlier periods,
diachronic development ofsuch usage patterns, and pragmatic e':pranatl0l1S
for language change in general (see Taavitsainen and Fitzmaurice
Taavitsainen and Jucker 2010 for recent overviews).4
Patterns of language use in earlier periods have often been StllG:leG
the basis of fictional data, for instance the writings of Geoffrey Cl,aucer
(see Pakkala-Weckstrom 2010 for an overview) or of William Shak,esI,eare
(see Busse and Busse 2010 for an overview). Such work often looks at
use of pronominal and nominal terms of address, at other re'lmres
politeness, at the use of specific speech acts or interjections. For
ical pragmaticists, such data are not imperfect renderings of actual
guage use but a type of data that warrants a careful pragmatic
sis on its own terms. Courtroom data and personal correspondence
also regularly been used for pragmatic analyses. CUlpeper and Kyto
offer a recent account of historical conversational data. Their studies
based on their own Corpus of English Dialogues 1560-1760, which comp'ris,es
data from trial proceedings, witness depositions, plays, fiction, and di,da,:ti,
works.
Historical pragmatics has developed quite considerably from its
nings in the 1990s and from more incidental earlier work; and this
reflects developments and paradigm shifts in linguistics in general.
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4.7 Pragmatics of the future
nlatic research in the first decade of the twenty-first century has beenFrag
characterized by an unprecedented diversification of sUbfield~ ~f pragmat-
~.. This is particularly true for the Continental European tradltlOn of prag-
~s. . .
inatics, and as such it was perhaps inevitable. If pragmatlCs ~s .seen as a
perspective, as a particular way of doing linguistics in gen.eral, It IS not sur-
prising that it starts to colonize more and more ofwhat used to.be subfields
of linguistics. Research interests and research methods of earlIer subfields
of linguistics were extended to encompass a pragmatic perspective as well.
And at the same time, pragmatics extended its scope to encompass research
uestions and research methods that had earlier been used by other fields
~flinguisticS. In many cases relevant pragmatic work in these fields started
in the 1990s or even 1980s, but it was often only in the twenty-first century
that the fields constituted themselves in a more recognizable and coher-
ent way, as for instance in the case of variational pragmatics or corpus
pragmatics.
The paradigm shifts that affected linguistics in general to some extent
constituted the field of pragmatics and to some extent shaped it in specific
ways. In the previous section I have outlined in separate histories what
appear to be the most important ofthese shifts. In reality, these shifts overlap
and converge in the trends that are discernible. To take just one example,
historical pragmatics clearly depends on the shift from a study of native
speaker competence to a study of language use, as there are no historical
speakers whose native language competence could be described. !h~s also
necessitates the use of empirical methods of investigation and WIthin the
empirical methods a reliance on corpus-based methods. Such investigations
focus much Inore on the heterogeneity and variability of the data than
on the homogeneity. And the shift from synchrony to diachrony is just
as constitutive of historical pragmatics as the shift from the description of
language competence to a description of usage patterns.
But what will the future development ofpragmatics look like? What might
a gaze into the crystal ball reveal about the pragmatics of the future? It is
difficult to extrapolate fron1 current developments into how it might develop
in the future. However, a few things can be predicted quite confidently.
Praginatics is a very strong field of scientific enquiry, and as such it will
continue to grow. At the moment, the distinction between the narrower
conceptualization of Anglo·American pragmatics and the broader,' socially
and culturally informed variety of Continental European pragmatics is still
clearly discernible. This was already pointed out some thirty years ago by
Levinson (1983: 2). It does not seem likely, therefore, that this difference will
be given up in the foreseeable future. .
Over the last two decades, personal computers, the internet, and the 1110bIle
phone have radica:lly changed the way many people communicate with each
511
512 ANDREAS H. JUCKER
other. These technical innovations have added new forms ofspoken
ten communication from email messages, short text messages, and
chat to skype conversations, tweets, weblogs, and various forms of
nication in virtual worlds and internet-based social networks. In recenty~:d
the flood of pragmatic analyses of these new forms of cOffilllunication,it
grown steadily (see, for instance, Crystal 2001, 2008; Barnes 2003;
2006; Heyd 2008). It is to be expected that the pragmatics of cornplJtei
mediated communication has an enormous potential for future growth.
There is very likely to be a continuing and perhaps accelerating
fication of approaches within pragmatics. Cooperation between LrclGlnona
fields of linguistics and pragmatics will continue. Historical pragmatiC,
which combines historical linguistics and pragmatics, and variational
matics, which combines dialectology and pragmatics, have been mentio,ne
above. Both of them are very promising fields with a vast range ofres:ear'c
opportunities. Corpus pragmatics is another such field that has only roro,,",
constituted itselfand that has enriched pragmatics with a new set ofJreSeal'clf
tools that offer exciting perspectives for exploring new and as yet uncharlted
pragmatic territory.
Semantics without
pragmatics?
Emma Borg
Philosophers of language (following the seminal work of Paul Grice) often
distinguish two types of linguistic content: literal or selnantic content
(usually discussed in the context of sentences) and pragnlatic content
or speaker meaning (usually discussed in the context of utterances). For
im;tanc,e, imagine I come to tea at your house and, on entering the kitchen,
the following sentence:
The cake on the table looks delicious.
Traditionally, since (1) is a well-formed sentence ofa natural language, many
theorists have been inclined to think that there is a proposition expressed
by the sentence which gives its literal meaning. So, at least at a first approx-
imation, (1) might be held to literally express the proposition that
(2) the cake on the table looks delicious.
However it also seems that, by uttering this sentence in this specific context,
I may well succeed in conveying an alternative or additional proposition (or
propositions). So, for instance, in this situation I may succeed in conveying
a further proposition like:
(3) I would like to have a slice of that cake.
It might initially be tenlpting here to think that what we have is one kind of
content - the literal meaning in (2) - which is entirely independent ofa context
ofutterance and another - the pragmatic speaker meaning - w?-tch is entirely
dependent on the context of utterance. If this were right, we could construe
semantic content as context~invariant content and speaker meaning as that
which covaries with changes in the context ofutterance, and we could expect
a semantic theory to be freed from any appeal to pragmatics.
Holding that semantic content is context-invariant might seem to be
Worthwhile for a number of reasons. First, there might be negative rea-
sons concerning the complex, holistic and perhaps rather nebulous nature
